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THE LIFE-SAVING MEDICINES EXPORT 
ACT: WHY THE PROPOSED U.S. 
COMPULSORY LICENSING SCHEME WILL 
FAIL TO EXPORT ANY MEDICINES OR 
SAVE ANY LIVES 
 
INTRODUCTION 
n the twenty-six years that have passed since doctors observed the 
first cases of AIDS, no region of the world has escaped the wrath of 
the AIDS pandemic.1 Fortunately, the HIV incidence rate2 reached its 
highest levels in the late 1990s, and has since stabilized.3 Nevertheless, 
an estimated 38.6 million people around the world were afflicted with 
HIV in 2005, including approximately 4.1 million new HIV infections 
and 2.8 million AIDS deaths.4 Although there is no cure for HIV/AIDS, 
antiretroviral drug treatment slows the progression of the virus. As a re-
sult, antiretroviral drug treatment has decreased the number of 
HIV/AIDS-related illnesses and deaths globally.5 However, access to 
                                                                                                             
 1. See Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS [UNAIDS], 2006 Report on 
the Global AIDS Epidemic, 1 (May 30, 2006), available at http://www.unaids.org/en/HIV 
_data/2006GlobalReport/default.asp. At the Special Session of the United Nations 
(“UN”) General Assembly on AIDS in 2001, 189 nations acknowledged the high priority 
of the AIDS epidemic by signing the historic Declaration of Commitment on HIV/AIDS. 
The Declaration established steps to encourage the UN’s Millennium Development Goal 
to stop and begin to reverse the AIDS epidemic by 2015. See generally G.A. Res. 55/2, 
para. 19, UN Doc. A/RES/55/2 (Sept. 18, 2000). To monitor progress, the Declaration 
required assessment of the epidemic at the end of 2003, 2005, and 2010. See id. The 2006 
Report on the Global AIDS Epidemic provides “the most comprehensive set of data on 
the country response to the AIDS epidemic ever complied.” UNAIDS, 2006 Report on 
the Global AIDS Epidemic: Executive Summary, 3 (May 30, 2006), available at 
http://data.unaids.org/pub/GlobalReport/2006/2006_GR-ExecutiveSummary_en.pdf. One 
hundred and twenty-six countries, with active participation by civil society groups, sub-
mitted information for the report. See id. 
 2. The “HIV incidence rate” is the number of people newly infected with HIV in a 
given year compared to the number of previously uninfected people. See UNAIDS, 2006 
Report on the Global AIDS Epidemic, supra note 1, at 8. 
 3. See id. 
 4. See id. 
 5. See id. at 150. At the International AIDS Conference XI in 1996, studies were 
presented to show that antiretroviral treatment was effective in preventing AIDS-related 
illness and death. In the years following the conference, the number of AIDS-related 
deaths dropped significantly in high-income developed countries, while the number of 
deaths in low- and middle-income countries continued to skyrocket. See id. 
I 
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antiretroviral drugs is limited in sub-Saharan Africa, where HIV/AIDS 
plagues citizens more than in any other area of the world.6 In recent 
years, there has been international activism demanding a universal hu-
man right to access life-saving treatment.7 As a result, access to antiret-
roviral drugs has increased in sub-Saharan Africa.8 In 2005, more than 
five times as many people used antiretroviral drugs in low- and middle-
income countries compared to those who used the drugs in 2001.9 Never-
theless, in sub-Saharan Africa, still only about one in six (seventeen per-
cent) of the 4.7 million people needing antiretroviral drug treatment now 
receive it.10 
There is no panacea that will resolve the problem of access to essential 
medicines in impoverished countries.11 These countries often lack ade-
quate health care systems and sufficient numbers of doctors or other 
health care workers to prescribe and distribute the drugs.12 In addition, 
government regulations often hinder access to essential medicines, 
through taxes on essential medicines or regulatory red tape.13 Notwith-
standing these infrastructure problems, poverty—and the resulting inabil-
ity to afford essential medicines—is arguably the most significant barrier 
to access.14 Even though access to essential medicines would face many 
                                                                                                             
 6. See id. at 15. In 2005, almost sixty-four percent of all people suffering from HIV 
(24.5 million people), and almost nine out of ten children under the age of fifteen suffer-
ing from HIV (2.0 million children) live in sub-Saharan Africa. In the same region, there 
were approximately 2.7 million new HIV infections, and approximately 2.0 million AIDS 
deaths. See id. For country-specific HIV/AIDS data in sub-Saharan Africa, see id. at 15–
23. 
 7. See id. at 150. 
 8. See id. at 152–53. On World AIDS Day 2003, the World Health Organization 
(“WHO”) introduced the ambitious “3 by 5 Initiative,” which sought to provide three 
million people in developing countries with antiretroviral drugs by 2005. WHO, About 
the 3 by 5 Initiative, http://www.who.int/3by5/about/initiative/en (last visited Oct. 9, 
2007). Although the 3 by 5 Initiative didn’t meet its goal, it spurred global action to in-
crease access to HIV/AIDS treatment. See UNAIDS, 2006 Report on the Global AIDS 
Epidemic, supra note 1, at 150. 
 9. See id. at 151. Antiretroviral drug use increased from approximately two hundred 
and forty thousand people in 2001 to approximately 1.3 million people in 2005. See id. 
 10. See id. at 15. Furthermore, progress throughout sub-Saharan Africa has not been 
uniform. While at least fifty percent of those needing antiretroviral treatment in Botswana 
and Namibia in 2005 received it, access in many other countries is as low as ten percent. 
See id. at 152. One-quarter of antiretroviral drug use in sub-Saharan Africa can be found 
in South Africa. See id. at 15. 
 11. See WHO Comm’n on Macroeconomics & Health [CMH], Macroeconomics and 
Health: Investing in Health for Economic Development 86 (Dec. 20, 2001). 
 12. See id. 
 13. See id. 
 14. See id. 
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obstacles even in the absence of pharmaceutical patents, patents affect 
prices, and remain a significant hurdle to access to medicines.15 Protec-
tion of intellectual property rights (“IPR”) permits a patent holder to 
charge high prices for patented brand-name medicines and grants a mo-
nopoly on the protected drug during the life of the patent.16 
In April 2006, the World Health Organization (“WHO”) Commission 
on Intellectual Property Rights, Innovation and Public Health (“CIPIH”) 
published its report to illustrate how an emphasis on protecting IPR may 
affect issues of public health.17 The Commission concluded that “innova-
tion [is] pointless in the absence of favourable conditions for poor people 
in developing countries to access existing, as well as new products. . . . 
Intellectual property rights are important, but as a means not an end.”18 
On one side of the debate, high prices of patented drugs are justified be-
cause they are necessary to fund a pharmaceutical company’s research 
                                                                                                             
 15. See generally DONALD G. RICHARDS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND 
GLOBAL CAPITALISM: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 53 (2004) 
(“IPRs are exclusive rights granted to the creators of knowledge-based commodities to 
market their creations. This grant is deemed necessary in order for the creators to engage 
in creative activity and production.”). 
 16. See David B. Resnik & Kenneth A. De Ville, Bioterrorism and Patent Rights: 
“Compulsory Licensure” and the Case of Cipro, 2 AM. J. BIOETHICS 29, 34 (2002). IPR 
advocates argue that a right to one’s ideas can be based on traditional property laws. Be-
cause knowledge and innovation are forms of “property,” there are libertarian justifica-
tions for patent law, which argue that a person should have a right to both the tangible 
and intangible products of one’s labor. See id.  
  Philosopher John Locke argues that, based on natural law principles, non-human 
resources are gifts from God, to which all of humankind enjoys a common property right. 
See RICHARDS, supra note 15, at 27–31. According to Locke, a person creates a private 
property right to these resources by using labor to increase the value of the property, as 
long as the person leaves enough of the resource for others. See id. (citing JOHN LOCKE, 
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Cambridge Univ. Press 1963) (1698)). It is argued that 
Locke’s concern with common property rights does not mean that knowledge and ideas 
are also gifts from God to be shared by humankind. See Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of 
Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 315 (1988). Instead, because ideas are inex-
haustible, and one person’s use of an idea does not deplete the common property, people 
are free to take and protect their ideas as private property under Locke’s labor theory of 
property. See id. 
 17. See WHO CIPIH, Public Health: Innovation and Intellectual Property Rights 
(Apr. 2006), available at http://www.who.int/intellectualproperty/report/en/. In May, the 
World Health Assembly and World Trade Organization (“WTO”) member states agreed 
to set up CIPIH to assess the relationship between the fields of intellectual property 
rights, innovation, and public health. The Commission was given the task of collecting 
data from different sources and recommending appropriate funding and incentives for the 
creation of new pharmaceutical products to fight diseases affecting developing countries. 
See id. 
 18. Id. at ix–x. 
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and development (“R&D”). Each successful medical innovation that re-
sults in millions of dollars in profits must pay for the millions of dollars 
lost during the countless failed R&D efforts.19 Nevertheless, these pat-
ents, and the high costs of the patented drugs they protect, are not justi-
fied to the extent that they deprive those who cannot afford life-saving 
medication.20 
This Note does not attempt to resolve all of the barriers preventing ac-
cess to essential medicines.21 Instead, this Note focuses solely on the re-
sponsibility of the United States, as a developed country with immense 
                                                                                                             
 19. See PhRMA, Key Industry Facts/About PhRMA, http://www.phrma.org/key_ 
industry_facts_about_phrma/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2007). Pharmaceutical Research and 
Manufacturers of America (“PhRMA”), discussing the findings of the Tufts Center for 
the Study of Drug Development, reports that development of a new drug is estimated to 
cost a pharmaceutical company $802 million, and takes an average of ten to fifteen years 
to get the drug from the laboratory to the pharmacy shelf. A pharmaceutical company 
recovers its R&D costs mainly from commercially successful products. PhRMA reports 
that out of 5,000 to 10,000 screened compounds, only 250 compounds succeed to reach 
preclinical testing, five pass preclinical testing to reach human clinical trials, and only 
one compound is eventually approved by the Food and Drug Administration. See id. 
  Consequently, proponents of pharmaceutical patents argue that the patents are 
necessary to allow temporary market exclusivity. Market exclusivity would permit these 
pharmaceutical companies to recoup their economic costs, profit from their inventions, 
and would incentivize future innovations. 
 20. Among these reasons are those founded in international law and principles of 
moral obligation. First, the right to health is emphasized in customary international law. 
See Alicia Ely Yamin, Not Just a Tragedy: Access to Medications as a Right Under In-
ternational Law, 21 B.U. INT’L L.J. 325, 336 (2003) (citing International Covenant on 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3). Article 12 of the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”) acknowl-
edges “the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physi-
cal and mental health.” Id. In addition, the Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights Com-
mittee recognized that a state’s minimum obligation pursuant to the ICESCR is to pro-
vide access to essential medicines. See id. at 337. Moreover, the right to enjoy the scien-
tific progress in medicine derives from Article 15 of the ICESCR, which “recognize[s] 
the right of everyone . . . [t]o enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications” 
applies to medications. Id. at 344. 
  Second, the obligation to developing countries is also supported by moral obliga-
tion. Under the theory of utilitarianism, there is a fundamental moral obligation to act 
when others are in need. Moreover, the greater the benefit to the person in need and the 
less hardship it causes for the actor, the more important is the obligation to act. See Mi-
chael A. Santoro, Human Rights and Human Needs: Diverse Moral Principles Justifying 
Third World Access to Affordable HIV/AIDS Drugs, 31 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 923, 
936–37 (2006). 
 21. Moreover, this Note does not argue that patents should not be granted for essential 
medicines, and recognizes that patent protection may be necessary to promote innovation 
and technological advances. 
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resources in the pharmaceutical sector,22 to help impoverished countries 
that do not have the manufacturing resources to supply their citizens with 
essential life-saving medicines.23 In light of this duty, the Life-Saving 
Medicines Export Act24 was introduced in 2006 to establish a compul-
sory licensing system that permits U.S. pharmaceutical companies to 
manufacture generic equivalents of patented medicines for export to de-
veloping countries.25 This Note focuses primarily on whether the Life-
Saving Medicines Export Act establishes an optimal compulsory licens-
ing system by providing the most effective incentives to generic drug 
companies to manufacture life-saving medicines for export to developing 
countries. 
First, Part I discusses the development of IPR at the international level 
and its impact on pharmaceutical policies in the United States. Next, Part 
II investigates the key provisions of the Life-Saving Medicines Export 
Act. Then, Part III identifies the key provisions of the Pledge to Africa 
Act, which established a Canadian compulsory licensing system. Part IV 
addresses the flaws with the Pledge to Africa Act, and analyzes the im-
provements that the Life-Saving Medicines Export Act has made over its 
Canadian counterpart. Furthermore, it examines whether the improve-
ments made in the Life-Saving Medicines Export Act are sufficient to 
incentivize generic companies to participate in the compulsory licensing 
system, thereby insuring that the legislation will succeed in increasing 
access to essential medicines for those who need them the most. This 
Note argues that while the Life-Saving Medicines Export Act eases pro-
cedural barriers and increases economic incentives for generic pharma-
ceutical companies, these changes alone are not enough. No matter how 
altruistic a generic company may be, or how severe a pandemic—like 
AIDS—may become, failure to incorporate greater financial incentives 
will render the Life-Saving Medicines Export Act useless in the fight to 
improve the life or death problem of access to essential medicines. 
                                                                                                             
 22. See generally PHRMA, ANNUAL REPORT 2006–2007 19 (2006). In 2005, PhRMA 
member companies invested approximately $39.4 billion in new R&D. Id. at 19. 
 23. In addition to altruistic reasons for assisting poorer countries, the United States 
should be motivated by its own self-interests. For example, such legislation would help 
improve U.S. relations in the international community. In addition, by addressing public 
health crises in other countries, the United States also decreases the chances of those 
health crises spreading to the United States. Furthermore, the United States ensures that 
these developing countries will be able to sustain their roles within the global economy. 
See 152 CONG. REC. S233-01, S5245 (daily ed. May 25, 2006) (statement of Sen. Leahy). 
 24. See infra Part II. 
 25. See 152 CONG. REC. S233-01, S5245 (daily ed. May 25, 2006) (statement of Sen. 
Leahy). 
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I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ON THE PATENT SYSTEM IN THE UNITED 
STATES AND AT THE INTERNATIONAL LEVEL 
When the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) was created in 1995 as 
the successor to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(“GATT”),26 “ideas and knowledge” were becoming more significant in 
international trade.27 At the same time, varying levels of protection and 
enforcement of intellectual property rights were causing greater strain in 
international economic relations.28 As a result, the WTO member states 
agreed upon and codified minimum standards that each state government 
had to meet in order to protect domestic IPR, as well as the IPR of other 
WTO member states.29 With respect to patents, WTO member states 
agreed that patents must be available to inventors, and patent holders 
should enjoy a minimum set of exclusive rights to the invention for an 
initial period of time.30 However, concern later arose over ensuring that 
the WTO standards did not prevent WTO member states from addressing 
issues of public health.31 As a result, the WTO adopted a new approach 
to assisting people in developing countries who suffer from life-
threatening diseases.32 The WTO now permits countries such as the 
United States, who possess robust pharmaceutical sectors, to produce and 
sell generic drugs to nations in need of the life-saving medication.33 
                                                                                                             
 26. See WTO, The Multilateral Trading System—Past, Present and Future, 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/inbrief_e/inbr01_e.htm (last visited Oct. 
9, 2007). 
 27. WTO, Intellectual Property: Protection and Enforcement, http://www.wto.org/ 
english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm7_e.htm (last visited Oct. 9, 2007). Intellectual 
property, consisting of ideas and knowledge, is best explained through examples: 
Most of the value of new medicines and other high technology products lies in 
the amount of invention, innovation, research, design and testing involved. 
Films, music recordings, books, computer software and on-line services are 
bought and sold because of the information and creativity they contain, not 
usually because of the plastic, metal or paper used to make them. 
Id. 
 28. See id. 
 29. See infra Part I.A. 
 30. See id. 
 31. See infra Part I.B. 
 32. See infra Part I.C. 
 33. See id. 
2007] LIFE-SAVING MEDICINES EXPORT ACT 243 
A. The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights 
On January 1, 1995, the WTO implemented the Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS Agreement”).34 
The objective of the TRIPS Agreement is to protect and enforce intellec-
tual property rights in order to reward and promote technological inven-
tions.35 At the same time, the TRIPS Agreement recognizes the need to 
transfer and disseminate this new knowledge to benefit social and eco-
nomic welfare.36 The provisions of the TRIPS Agreement that concern 
patents require that WTO member states provide a patent for any techno-
logical invention that is new, non-obvious, and useful.37 In exchange for 
these rights, a patent applicant must disclose information about the in-
vention that would allow a “person skilled in the art” to create the prod-
uct.38 If the application is granted, the patent holder has the ability to 
prevent others from “making, using, offering for sale, selling, or import-
ing” the invention.39 These exclusive rights are protected for twenty 
years from the date that the applicant files the patent application.40 
However, there are some exceptions to the exclusive rights that have 
been granted to the patent holder. Specifically, Article 31 of the TRIPS 
Agreement permits WTO member states to use the invention without the 
patent holder’s authorization.41 Included in such allowed use is govern-
ment use and government-authorized third-party use pursuant to a “com-
pulsory license.”42 Before the government authorizes use of the inven-
                                                                                                             
 34. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 
Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter 
TRIPS Agreement]. The WTO was created on January 1, 1995 as the successor to GATT. 
WTO, What is the World Trade Organization?, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/ 
whatis_e/tif_e/fact1_e.htm (last visited Oct. 9, 2007). The TRIPS Agreement is one of 
several WTO agreements that serve as the WTO’s rules on trade. WTO, Overview: A 
Navigational Guide, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm1_e.htm 
(last visited Oct. 9, 2007). 
 35. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 34, art. 7. 
 36. See id. 
 37. See id. art. 27(1). Extending far beyond pharmaceuticals, patents are available for 
“products or processes, in all fields of technology, provided that they are new, involve an 
inventive step and are capable of industrial application.” Id. 
 38. Id. art. 29(1). 
 39. Id. art. 28(1). 
 40. See id. art. 33. 
 41. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 34, art. 31. 
 42. See id. The TRIPS Agreement does not use the term “compulsory licensing.” 
Instead, Article 31 discusses “Other Use Without Authorization of the Right Holder.” 
Compulsory licensing is only one example of such “other use.” See WTO, Obligations 
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tion, it must ensure that the patent holder’s rights are respected. First, the 
compulsory license applicant must first make “efforts to obtain authori-
zation from the right holder on reasonable commercial terms and condi-
tions” and have been unsuccessful “within a reasonable period of time” 
prior to filing the compulsory license application.43 Nevertheless, the 
government may waive this required effort in cases of “national emer-
gency or other circumstances of extreme urgency,” or for “public non-
commercial use.”44 Second, Article 31 requires that “adequate remunera-
tion” be paid to the patent holder for use of the invention.45 Article 31(h) 
explains that the payment will take into account “the circumstances of 
each case” and “the economic value of the authorization.”46 
Article 31 also allows only limited use of the invention by the compul-
sory license applicant. Because the patent holder is still entitled to use of 
the invention, the compulsory licensee’s rights are non-exclusive.47 In 
addition, the compulsory license applicant may not use the invention be-
yond the scope for which the compulsory license was granted.48 Fur-
thermore, Article 31 limits the government’s authority to grant compul-
sory licenses to inventions used predominantly in the domestic market.49 
B. The Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health 
The TRIPS Agreement raised concerns that poor countries may face 
greater difficulties in obtaining drugs because of the TRIPS Agreement’s 
safeguards on intellectual property.50 In response, WTO member states 
adopted the Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health 
(“Doha Declaration”) on November 14, 2001 at the WTO’s Fourth Min-
isterial Conference in Doha, Qatar.51 First, the Doha Declaration “recog-
nize[d] the gravity of the public health problems afflicting many devel-
oping and least-developed countries, especially those resulting from 
HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics.”52 Second, al-
                                                                                                             
and Exceptions, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/factsheet_pharm02_e.htm 
(last visited Oct. 9, 2007). 
 43. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 34, art. 31(b). 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. art. 31(h). 
 46. Id. 
 47. See id. art. 31(d). 
 48. See id. art. 31(c). 
 49. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 34, art. 31(f). 
 50. See WTO, The Separate Doha Declaration Explained, http://www.wto.org/ 
English/tratop_e/trips_e/healthdeclexpln_e.htm (last visited Oct. 9, 2007). 
 51. See WTO, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1 
(2002) [hereinafter Doha Declaration]. 
 52. Id. 
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though the Doha Declaration acknowledged that the protection of IPR 
promotes the development of new medicines, it also recognized that the 
patent system causes increased drug prices.53 Third, the Doha Declara-
tion affirmed that the TRIPS Agreement “should not prevent Members 
from taking measures to protect public health . . . and should be inter-
preted and implemented in a manner supportive of WTO Members’ right 
to protect public health and, in particular, to promote access to medicines 
for all.”54 
The Doha Declaration therefore provides flexibility to the TRIPS 
Agreement to ensure that intellectual property protection does not create 
obstacles to the management of public health problems.55 For example, 
the Doha Declaration recognizes the right of WTO member states to 
grant compulsory licenses to generic drug companies to permit manufac-
turing of patented brand name drugs.56 In addition, the Doha Declaration 
allows each WTO member state to determine the grounds for granting 
compulsory licenses.57 WTO member states also have the right to define 
“national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency,”58 un-
der which the TRIPS Agreement permits a WTO member state to waive 
the requirement that the generic drug manufacturer must have unsuccess-
fully attempted to negotiate with the patented drug manufacturer before 
the proposed user may obtain a compulsory license. Specifically, the 
Doha Declaration explains that “public health crises, including those re-
lating to HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics, can rep-
resent a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme ur-
gency.”59 The Doha Declaration, however, leaves unresolved the prob-
lem of WTO member states that lack manufacturing capabilities in the 
pharmaceutical sector to effectively use compulsory licensing, in what is 
referred to as “Paragraph 6.”60 The Declaration recognizes the problem, 
and instructs the TRIPS Council to report back to the General Council 
with a solution to the problem by the end of 2002.61 In the interim, be-
                                                                                                             
 53. See Doha Declaration, supra note 51, para. 3. 
 54. Id. para. 4. 
 55. See id. para. 5. 
 56. See id. para. 5(b). 
 57. See id. 
 58. Id. para. 5(c). 
 59. Doha Declaration, supra note 51, para. 5(c). 
 60. See id. para. 6. 
 61. See id. para. 6 (“We recognize that WTO Members with insufficient or no manu-
facturing capacities in the pharmaceutical sector could face difficulties in making effec-
tive use of compulsory licensing under the TRIPS Agreement. We instruct the Council 
for TRIPS to find an expeditious solution to this problem and to report to the General 
Council before the end of 2002.”). 
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cause Article 31(f) of the TRIPS Agreement limits products made under 
compulsory licenses to domestic use, the Doha Declaration left countries 
without the resources to produce pharmaceuticals without access to life-
saving medications.62 
C. The Decision of the General Council of 30 August 2003 
On August 30, 2003, the General Council approved a draft decision 
(“2003 Decision”) which amended the TRIPS Agreement by implement-
ing Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration.63 The 2003 Decision makes it 
easier for poor countries, unable to manufacture medicines themselves, 
to import generic drugs made in other countries under compulsory li-
cense.64 The 2003 Decision lifted the ban on exporting generic drugs 
made under compulsory licensing by permitting export of such generic 
drugs to “eligible importing Members.”65 An eligible importing country 
is one which is a “least-developed country” (“LDC”),66 or a WTO mem-
                                                                                                             
 62. Press Release, WTO, Decision Removes Final Patent Obstacle to Cheap Drug 
Imports (Aug. 30, 2003), available at http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres03_e/ 
pr350_e.htm. 
 63. See WTO, Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS 
Agreement and Public Health, WT/L/540, 43 I.L.M. 509 (2003) [hereinafter 2003 Deci-
sion]. 
 64. See 2003 Decision, supra note 63, at 509 (“[n]oting . . . the instruction . . . in 
paragraph 6 of the [Doha Declaration] to find an expeditious solution to the problem of 
the difficulties that WTO Members with insufficient or no manufacturing capacities in 
the pharmaceutical sector could face in making effective use of compulsory licensing 
under the TRIPS Agreement”). 
 65. 2003 Decision, supra note 63, at 510. 
 66. The UN Committee for Development Policy reviews the list of least-developed 
countries every three years. In the 2003 Report of the UN Committee for Development 
Policy, qualification for the category of “least-developed country” (“LDC”) is based on 
three criteria: 
(1) low-income, measured by the country’s average of the gross national in-
come (GNI) per capita; 
(2) human resource weakness, measured by the country’s human assets index, 
which factors in the country’s nutrition, health, education, and adult literacy; 
and 
(3) economic vulnerability, measured by the country’s economic vulnerability 
index, which factors in the country’s structural vulnerability rather than vulner-
ability resulting from government policy.  
To be added to the list, a country must meet all three criteria. To become eligible to 
graduate from the list, a country must meet minimum threshold levels for two of the three 
criteria. To qualify for graduation, a country must meet two of the three criteria for two 
consecutive reviews. See UN Office of the High Representative for the Least Developed 
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ber state that has notified the TRIPS Council that it is importing “in the 
case of a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency 
or public non-commercial use.”67 A WTO member state seeking to im-
port generic drugs manufactured under compulsory license must notify 
the TRIPS Council of the specific names and quantities of requested 
medicines.68 In addition, the eligible importing country must confirm that 
it is a “least-developed country” or has “insufficient or no manufacturing 
capacities in the pharmaceutical sector” for the requested medicines.69 
The 2003 Decision also includes provisions that ensure that the medi-
cines are used to protect public health, and not for industrial or commer-
cial policy objectives.70 For instance, compulsory licenses must limit the 
medicine production to only the amount necessary to meet the needs of 
the importing country.71 In addition, the generic drugs produced under 
compulsory license must be physically differentiated from their patented 
equivalents, using means such as special packaging or special colors or 
shapes of the drugs.72 The 2003 Decision also charges the importing 
country with taking “reasonable measures within their means, propor-
tionate to their administrative capacities and to the risk of trade diversion 
to prevent re-exportation of the products.”73 Furthermore, all countries 
are required to have legal safeguards to prevent importation of these 
drugs in violation of this compulsory system.74 
On December 6, 2005, WTO member states approved the 2003 Deci-
sion’s changes to permanently amend the TRIPS Agreement.75 Although 
the amendment will not take effect until two-thirds of WTO member 
states have ratified the changes by the December 1, 2007 deadline, these 
changes remain in effect until then.76 
                                                                                                             
Countries, Landlocked Developing Countries, and Small Island Developing States, The 
Criteria for the Identification of the LDCs, http://www.un.org/special-rep/ohrlls/ 
ldc/ldc%20criteria.htm (last visited Oct. 9, 2007); UN Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], 
Sub-Comm. for Dev. Policy, Report on the Sixth Session (2 March – 2 April 2004), 15–
18, UN Doc. E/2004/33 (2004). 
 67. See 2003 Decision, supra note 63, at 510. 
 68. See id. 
 69. See id. 
 70. See WTO, Decision Removes Final Patent Obstacle to Cheap Drug Imports, su-
pra note 62. 
 71. See 2003 Decision, supra note 63, at 510. 
 72. See id. 
 73. Id. at 511. 
 74. See id. 
 75. See Press Release, WTO, Members OK Amendment to Make Health Flexibility 
Permanent, WTO Doc. Press/426 (Dec. 6, 2005). 
 76. See id. 
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D. Changing U.S. Viewpoints on Intellectual Property Rights and Public 
Health 
The United States arguably has the strictest patent system of WTO 
member states.77 This adherence to intellectual property protection is re-
flected in the U.S. response to South Africa’s Medicines and Related 
Substances Control Amendment Act, which was introduced in 1997.78 
The Act took several steps to promote access to cheaper drugs in order to 
combat the AIDS epidemic in South Africa.79 The Act was enacted in an 
attempt to reduce drug prices by: (1) prohibiting price markups, (2) en-
couraging generic drugs, and (3) allowing South Africa’s health minister 
to ignore its patent laws when a health crisis exists.80 In response, thirty-
nine pharmaceutical companies, with the support of the U.S. govern-
ment, sued the South African government for enacting legislation that 
violated the TRIPS Agreement.81 Moreover, the U.S. government threat-
ened trade sanctions against South Africa if it implemented the Act.82 
However, the dispute ended when the pharmaceutical companies 
dropped their lawsuit because of the public protest over the lawsuit.83 
In 2001, this strict U.S. policy on patent protection reached a turning 
point. Just as the nation changed dramatically in the aftermath of the 
September 11th attacks, so too did the U.S. government’s views on pat-
ent protection.84 In October 2001, there were numerous cases of deaths 
resulting from anthrax exposure, which created fear of a bioterrorism 
attack.85 Despite a shortage of Cipro—the only anthrax antibiotic the 
                                                                                                             
 77. See also Erika Mullenbach, Comment, The Influence of Disease on the Evolution 
of U.S. Patent Law and Policy Towards Foreign Patent Laws in the Late Twentieth to 
Early Twenty-First Century, 7 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 227, 229–32 (2005) (ex-
plaining that the U.S. pharmaceutical industry, and the United States in general, criticize 
the TRIPS Agreement for providing flexibility to “strict, U.S.-style” patent protection). 
 78. See Donald G. McNeil Jr., Medicine Merchants: Patent and Patients; As Devas-
tating Epidemics Increase, Nations Take On Drug Companies, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2000, 
§ 1, at 18. 
 79. See Rachel L. Swarns, Drug Makers Drop South Africa Suit Over AIDS Medicine, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2001, at A1. 
 80. See id.; McNeil, supra note 78. 
 81. See Swarns, supra note 79. 
 82. See McNeil, supra note 78. The U.S. Department of Commerce placed South 
Africa on a watch list, which is the first step leading to trade sanctions. In addition, Con-
gress passed a bill that required South Africa to drop the Act in order to receive any U.S. 
aid. Moreover, President Clinton also voiced his disagreement to President Nelson Man-
dela. See id. 
 83. See Swarns, supra note 79. 
 84. See generally Mullenbach, supra note 77, at 239. 
 85. See Philip Shenon, A Nation Challenged: The Disease; U.S. is Stepping Up Plan 
for Handling Anthrax Threat, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2001, at A1. 
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U.S. Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) had approved—
pharmaceutical company Bayer A.G.86 refused to permit other companies 
to manufacture Cipro.87 The U.S. government wanted to purchase a 
stockpile of Cipro to treat Americans in the event of a widespread attack, 
but was unable to convince Bayer to significantly lower their prices.88 In 
response, the U.S. government threatened to bypass the Cipro patent and 
follow Canada’s lead in resorting to generic alternatives to combat the 
anthrax attacks.89 However, the United States did not need to override the 
Cipro patent; Bayer agreed to further reduce the price of Cipro, and a 
deal between Bayer and the U.S. government was reached.90 The U.S. 
response to the anthrax scare, in light of its reaction to South Africa’s 
Medicines and Related Substances Control Amendment Act, was 
strongly criticized as “blatant hypocrisy.”91 The United States was 
viewed as having a double standard—one standard “regarding the acces-
sibility of patent relaxation in the context of health emergencies which 
confront ‘us,’” and a different standard “in the context of health emer-
gencies which constantly confront ‘them’ in the developing world.”92 
Although five people died as a result of the anthrax attacks in 2001,93 the 
severity of the national emergency was far from comparable to the 
HIV/AIDS crisis in countries such as South Africa.94 Therefore, in light 
of this evident double standard that Western countries may hold, WTO 
member states—both developed and developing countries—easily agreed 
that the TRIPS Agreement should be interpreted to improve public 
health.95 
The U.S. Trade Representative welcomed the 2003 Decision, which 
“allow[s] countries to override patent rights when necessary to export 
life-saving drugs to developing countries that face public health crises 
                                                                                                             
 86. See id. 
 87. See Keith Bradsher, A Nation Challenged: The Antibiotic; Bayer Insists Cipro 
Supply is Sufficient; Fights Generic, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2001, at B7. Bayer’s Cipro 
patent was not scheduled to expire in the United States until 2003. See id. 
 88. See Keith Bradsher with Edmund L. Andrews, A Nation Challenged: Cipro; U.S. 
Says Bayer Will Cut Cost of Its Anthrax Drug, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2001, at B7. 
 89. See id. The Canadian Health Ministry overrode Bayer’s Cipro patent and ordered 
a Canadian pharmaceutical company to produce a generic equivalent to Cipro. See id. 
 90. See id. 
 91. Sarah Joseph, Pharmaceutical Corporations and Access to Drugs: The “Fourth 
Wave” of Corporate Human Rights Scrutiny, 25 HUM. RTS. Q. 425, 447 (2003). 
 92. See id. 
 93. See id. at 447 n.110. 
 94. See id. at 447. 
 95. See id. 
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but cannot produce drugs for themselves.”96 Moreover, international or-
ganizations such as the WHO CIPIH urge: “Countries should provide in 
their legislation powers to use compulsory licensing, in accordance with 
the TRIPS agreement, where this power might be useful as one of the 
means available to promote, inter alia, research that is directly relevant to 
the specific health problems of developing countries.”97 To that same 
end, the Life-Savings Medicines Act of 2006 was introduced as “the 
catalyst for saving the lives or improving the health of millions of fami-
lies in impoverished nations.”98 
II. LIFE-SAVING MEDICINES EXPORT ACT OF 2006 
Senator Patrick Leahy introduced the Life-Saving Medicines Export 
Act to Congress on May 25, 2006.99 The purpose of the Life-Saving 
Medicines Act is to promote public health by establishing the infrastruc-
ture to permit U.S. generic drug companies to manufacture life-saving 
medicines in the United States under compulsory license, and then export 
these medicines to developing countries with insufficient or no manufac-
turing capability in the pharmaceutical sector to produce the life-saving 
medicines themselves.100 
The Life-Saving Medicines Export Act seeks to amend Title 35 of the 
United States Code, which governs patents.101 Specifically, it establishes 
procedures for granting authority to the Under Secretary for Commerce 
for Intellectual Property and Director of the Patent and Trademark Office 
to issue compulsory licenses.102 Moreover, the Life-Saving Medicines 
Export Act also establishes an office within the Patent and Trademark 
Office (“PTO”) to assist countries seeking medicines to identify pharma-
ceutical companies that may manufacture such medicines under compul-
sory license.103 The Act also explicitly states that the generic company’s 
action under the compulsory licensing system is not an infringement of 
the patent.104 
                                                                                                             
 96. Life-Saving Medicines Export Act of 2006, S. 3175, 109th Cong. § 2(b)(1) 
(2006). 
 97. WHO CIPIH, Public Health: Innovation and Intellectual Property Rights, supra 
note 17, at 176. 
 98. See 152 CONG. REC. S233-01, S5245 (daily ed. May 25, 2006) (statement of Sen. 
Leahy). 
 99. See id. 
 100. See generally S. 3175 § 2. 
 101. See id. 
 102. See id. 
 103. See id. § 3(a). 
 104. See id. § 4. 
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The pharmaceutical company seeking to produce the essential medi-
cine (“generic company”) must submit an application to the PTO, identi-
fying the eligible importing country in need of the medicine (“importing 
country”).105 An importing country must be: an LDC,106 a WTO member 
state that has certified to the WTO General Council of its intent to par-
ticipate in the compulsory licensing system, or a non-WTO member state 
that lacks the manufacturing capacity to produce the drug itself.107 More-
over, the generic company may apply for a multi-country license for the 
production of medicine that will be exported to multiple countries.108 Al-
though only eligible countries may import medicines through the pro-
posed compulsory licensing system, the application may also include the 
names of any nongovernmental organization (“NGO”) that will assist the 
importing country with the medicines.109 
The generic company may apply for a license for any pharmaceutical 
product,110 but must specify the scope of the drug production. The ge-
neric company must first specify the name of the drug it seeks to produce 
and export, as well as the patented equivalent,111 where the patented drug 
has received either WHO or U.S. FDA approval.112 In addition, the ge-
neric company must estimate the quantity of medicines to be produced 
and exported.113 Before an application is approved by the PTO, the ge-
neric company must show that it made efforts to negotiate directly with 
the patent holder.114 Specifically, the generic company’s application must 
include a copy of a written request to the patent holder asking for a vol-
untary license to produce the drug, as well as a description of any subse-
quent negotiations.115 The generic company is also required to wait at 
least sixty days after sending the request before submitting an application 
to the PTO for a compulsory license.116 
                                                                                                             
 105. See S. 3175 § 3(a). 
 106. See supra note 66 and accompanying text (defining least-developed country). 
 107. See S. 3175 § 3(a). 
 108. See id. 
 109. See id. 
 110. See id. The Life-Saving Medicines Export Act defines a “pharmaceutical product” 
eligible for generic production as “any patented product, or pharmaceutical product, in-
cluding components of that product, manufactured through a patented process, of the 
pharmaceutical sector including any drug, active ingredient of a drug, diagnostic, or vac-
cine needed to prevent or treat potentially life threatening public health problems.” Id. 
 111. See id. 
 112. See id. 
 113. See S. 3175 § 3(a). 
 114. See id. 
 115. See id. 
 116. See id. 
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Once the application has been submitted, the PTO must approve or 
deny the application within sixty days.117 A denied applicant must appeal 
the decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, subject 
to final review by the Supreme Court upon certiorari.118 If the application 
is approved, the generic company is limited to producing the medicine 
for only the importing country listed in the application, and must export 
the medicine only to the importing country.119 The compulsory license is 
effective for seven years, but the generic company may apply for a li-
cense renewal once, which would extend the license for an additional 
seven years.120 Moreover, if the generic company notifies the PTO that 
the original estimated quantity of the drug will not be sufficient to meet 
the importing country’s need, the PTO may increase the licensed drug 
quantity without need for a new license application.121 A compulsory 
license may cease to exist, however, if the PTO determines, pursuant to a 
petition by the patent holder, that the circumstances warranting the com-
pulsory license no longer exist and will not reoccur.122 
The generic company is also responsible for distinctly labeling and 
packaging the medicine so that it is distinguishable from the patented 
drug, and is identifiable as created under the compulsory licensing sys-
tem.123 However, this requirement may be waived if it is not feasible, or 
if doing so would significantly impact the price of producing the drug.124 
Moreover, the requirement may be waived “under urgent circumstances 
for limited quantities.”125 
The Life-Saving Medicines Export Act also requires a generic com-
pany granted a compulsory license to pay remuneration to the patent 
holder within forty-five days after the generic company exported the 
drugs to the importing country.126 In order to set a reasonable royalty 
                                                                                                             
 117. See S. 3175 § 3(a). The PTO has the option of denying an application but request-
ing additional information. The generic company must submit the supplemental informa-
tion within thirty days of the PTO’s request. The PTO then makes a final decision within 
sixty days of receipt of the additional information. See id. 
 118. See id. The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals may set aside the PTO decision if it 
finds the decision to be: (1) “arbitrary [or] capricious,” (2) “contrary to constitutional 
right,” (3) “in violation of a statutory right,” or (4) “without observance of procedure 
required by law.” Id. 
 119. See id. 
 120. See id. 
 121. See id. 
 122. See id. 
 123. See S. 3175 § 3(a). 
 124. See id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. See id. 
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amount, the PTO consults with Health and Human Services, the National 
Institutes of Health, the U.S. Agency for International Development, and 
the Centers of Disease Control.127 The remuneration is capped at four 
percent of the commercial value of the drug, but in determining the roy-
alty amount, the PTO considers: “[T]he need for the [generic company] . 
. . to make a reasonable return sufficient to sustain a continued participa-
tion in humanitarian objectives,” “[t]he humanitarian and noncommercial 
reasons for issuing a compulsory license,” “[t]he economic value to the 
importing country,” “[t]he need for low-cost pharmaceutical products by 
persons in eligible countries, in the importing country,” “[t]he ordinary 
levels of profitability in the United States . . . and any relevant interna-
tional trends in relevant prices as reported by the United Nations or other 
appropriate humanitarian organizations.”128 In addition, if the importing 
country is on the UN Human Development Index (“HDI”), or suffers 
from circumstances similar to a country on the index, the required roy-
alty payment is much lower than the four percent cap.129 
The Life-Saving Medicines Export Act also provides safeguards to en-
sure that medicine production is not impeded by onerous procedures dur-
ing times of emergency.130 Therefore, if the importing country is in a 
state of “a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme ur-
gency,” the PTO may employ expedited approval procedures.131 More-
over, the PTO may waive any requirement of the compulsory licensing 
system—including the requirement that the generic company first nego-
tiate with the patent holder—or may postpone the royalty calculation 
until after the application has been approved.132 
The Life-Saving Medicines Export Act also directs the PTO to estab-
lish the National Advisory Board on Implementation of the General 
Council Decision to provide guidance with the compulsory licensing sys-
tem, including determining appropriate royalty amounts.133 Recognizing 
the importance of expert advice, the Board will include scholars and ex-
                                                                                                             
 127. See S. 3175 § 3(a). 
 128. See id. 
 129. See id. If the country is on the HDI, the rate for royalty calculation is as follows: 
 
1 + (total number of HDI countries) – (importing country’s HDI rank)
(total number of HDI countries) 
    X   0.04 
 
See id. 
 130. See id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. See id. 
 133. See S. 3175 § 5. 
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perts in fields affecting, as well as those impacted by, the compulsory 
licensing system.134 
III. CANADA’S BILL C-9: AN ACT TO AMEND THE PATENT ACT AND THE 
FOOD AND DRUGS ACT (“THE JEAN CHRÉTIEN PLEDGE TO AFRICA 
ACT”)135 
On May 14, 2004, Canada amended its Patent Act to authorize com-
pulsory licenses for the production of generic drugs for export to eligible 
developing countries.136 By enacting this legislation, Canada became the 
first Group of Eight137 country to implement the WTO General Council’s 
                                                                                                             
 134. See S. 3175 § 5(c). The Board shall include the following ten members: one “aca-
demic expert on the subject of pharmaceutical matters and patent law;” two “individual[s] 
with expertise relating to the WTO, the TRIPS/health solution, and the General Council 
Decision;” two “individual[s] with expertise relating to the needs of persons living in 
least-developed and developing nations with respect to access to low-cost patented phar-
maceutical products;” two “individual[s] who represent international organizations, such 
as the United Nations, the World Bank, international nongovernmental organizations, and 
religious faiths, and who have expert knowledge regarding the General Council Decision 
and the issues raised by that decision;” one “physician with experience in treating persons 
with HIV/AIDS, malaria, tuberculosis, or other infectious diseases;” one “individual 
representing major pharmaceutical manufacturers in the United States;” and one “indi-
vidual representing major generic manufacturers of pharmaceutical products in the 
United States.” Id. 
 135. The Jean Chrétien Pledge to Africa Act, together with supporting regulations, 
comprises what is now referred to as Canada’s Access to Medicines Regime (“CAMR”). 
See Canada’s Access to Medicines Regime, http://camr-rcam.hc-sc.gc.ca/intro/context_ 
e.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2007). 
 136. See The Jean Chrétien Pledge to Africa Act, 2004 S.C., ch. 23 (Can.). 
 137. The Group of Eight (G8) is “an unofficial forum of the heads of the leading indus-
trialized democracies.” The Group holds summits regularly as a forum “to harmonize 
attitudes to acute international problems” by reaching informal agreements on individual 
measures each country can take to achieve the Group’s goals. Although it is not a formal 
international organization, the G8 has working groups, expert groups, and task forces. See 
Official Web site of the G8 Presidency of the Russian Federation in 2006, 
http://en.g8russia.ru/g8/history/shortinfo/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2007). The G8 was founded 
in 1975, when leaders of France, Japan, the United States, Britain, and Italy met to dis-
cuss current economic problems existing at that time. Canada joined the Group the fol-
lowing year, and Russia became a member in 1998. Because the G8 includes all of the 
world’s major economic and political powers, their decisions on key global issues have 
great impact. For example, the G8 countries donated $1.4 billion to set up the Global 
Health Fund, which is used for different projects that fight AIDS, tuberculosis, and ma-
laria around the world. See What is the G8 Summit?, http://www.g8.gov.uk/serv-
let/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1078995913300 
(last visited Oct. 9, 2007). 
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Decision of August 2003.138 The stated purpose of the legislation is “to 
facilitat[e] access to pharmaceutical products to address public health 
problems afflicting many developing and least-developed countries, es-
pecially those resulting from HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other 
epidemics.”139 The Pledge to Africa Act received the support of NGOs, 
civil society groups, and even the pharmaceutical industry.140 Neverthe-
less, widespread criticism within these same groups resulted in a general 
consensus that the bill’s flaws may prevent it from achieving its goal of 
improving access to life-saving medicines.141 Harsher critics accuse the 
Canadian government of betraying people in developing countries by 
passing legislation that “perpetuate[s] inequitable access to medicines by 
inviting anti-competitive behaviour by multinational pharmaceutical 
companies, protecting these companies’ monopolies and [profiting] at 
the expense of the lives of patients.”142 During its drafting, however, the 
Canadian government implemented suggestions by brand name pharma-
ceutical companies, generic companies, and civil society organizations to 
address potential weaknesses with the legislation.143 Nevertheless, more 
                                                                                                             
 138. See Rachel Kiddell-Monroe, Canada’s Generic Drug Law is All Talk, No Action, 
GLOBE AND MAIL (Toronto), Aug. 14, 2006, at A15; Mark D. Penner & Prakash Naraya-
nan, Amendments to the Canadian Patent Act to Address Drug Access: Is Help on the 
Way?, 60 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 459, 460–61 (2005). 
 139. 2004 S.C., ch. 23 § 21.01. 
 140. See generally Press Release, United Nations Children’s Fund [UNICEF], 
UNICEF Hails Canada’s Move to Expand Access to AIDS Drugs (Sept. 29, 2003) (prais-
ing Canada’s Pledge to Africa Act as “the first major move by a major, industrialised 
country to overcome a key structural hurdle in getting life-saving medicines to people 
who desperately need them”). 
 141. See e.g., CANADIAN HIV/AIDS LEGAL NETWORK, THE JEAN CHRÉTIEN PLEDGE TO 
AFRICA ACT AND ITS IMPACT ON IMPROVING ACCESS TO HIV/AIDS TREATMENT IN 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 4 (Aug. 1, 2006), http://www.aidslaw.ca/publications/interfaces/ 
downloadFile.php?ref=696 (identifying the main flaws as: (1) the Act limited pharmaceu-
tical products available for compulsory license, (2) the Act had additional requirements 
for non-WTO members compared to WTO members, (3) and a compulsory license 
granted under the Act had a short lifespan). 
 142. Press Release, Médecins Sans Frontières [MSF], Amending Canada’s Drug Patent 
Law: A Betrayal of Patients in Developing Countries (Feb. 26, 2004), available at 
http://www.aidslaw.ca/publications/interfaces/downloadDocumentFile.php?ref=459. 
 143. See News Release, Canadian HIV/AIDS Legal Network, Canada Proceeds with 
Bill C-9 on Cheaper Medicine Exports: NGOs Say Initiative is Important, and Urge Other 
Countries to Avoid the Flaws in the Canadian Model (Apr. 28, 2004), available at 
http://www.aidslaw.ca/publications/interfaces/downloadDocumentFile.php?ref=453. A 
number of civil society groups contributed their expertise to the Canadian Parliament by 
proposing amendments to the Pledge to Africa Act to improve the legislation’s efficacy. 
See id. Additionally, amendments to the Pledge to Africa Act included recommendations 
by members of the Canadian generic pharmaceutical industry. See News Release, Cana-
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than three years after the Pledge to Africa Act was introduced into Cana-
dian law, no developing country has received life-saving medicines 
through the new Canadian compulsory licensing system.144 
Under the Pledge to Africa Act, the Canadian government may issue a 
compulsory license for a defined set of patented medicines for export to a 
defined set of developing countries.145 The medicines available for ge-
neric production are limited to the pharmaceutical products that were on 
the WHO list of essential medicines146 and were patented in Canada at 
the time that the Pledge to Africa Act was enacted.147 The Pledge To Af-
rica Act also limits export of the generic medicines to countries that are: 
LDCs,148 WTO member states that have not declined to use the system as 
importers, or WTO member states that have stated an intent to participate 
in the compulsory licensing system only if they face national emergency 
or insufficient manufacturing capacity for the medicine they seek under 
the license.149 However, the Pledge to Africa Act includes procedures for 
updating the lists of medicines and eligible countries.150 The Minister and 
the Minister of Health may recommend the addition of any patented 
product that addresses a health problem in a developing country.151 
                                                                                                             
dian Generic Pharmaceutical Ass’n [CGPA], Government Amendments to Bill C-9 Fall 
Short (Apr. 20, 2004), available at http://www.canadiangenerics.ca/en/news%5Capr_20_ 
04.shtml. 
 144. See infra note 177 and accompanying text. 
 145. See 2004 S.C., ch. 23 § 21.04, Schedule 1–4. 
 146. See WHO, Essential Medicines, http://www.who.int/medicines/services/ess 
medicines_def/en/index.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2007). The WHO Expert Committee on 
the Selection and Use of Essential Medicine compiles the essential medicines list by se-
lecting products that satisfy priority health care needs, and takes into consideration the 
disease prevalence, as well as the comparative efficacy, safety, and cost-effectiveness of 
medicines. See id. 
 147. See Lalita Acharya & Kristen Douglas, Canada Library of Parliament, Bill C-9: 
An Act to Amend the Patent Act and the Food and Drugs Act: Legislative Summary 2 
(Mar. 3, 2004); Pledge to Africa Act, supra note 136, at Schedule 1. 
 148. See supra note 66 and accompanying text (defining least-developed country). 
 149. See Acharya & Douglas, supra note 147, at 2. The Pledge to Africa Act includes 
three schedules of eligible importing countries. Schedule two lists all countries that the 
UN has determined are LDCs. Schedule three lists all WTO member states that have not 
declined to use the compulsory licensing system to import medicines. Schedule four lists 
all WTO member states who have stated an intention to use the compulsory licensing 
system only in the event of a national emergency or other extreme urgency situation. See 
id. 
 150. See 2004 S.C., ch. 23 § 21.03. 
 151. See id. § 21.03(1)(a). Based on a recommendation by the Minister and Minster of 
Health, the Governor in Council may add “any patented product that may be used to ad-
dress public health problems afflicting many developing and least-developed countries, 
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Moreover, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister for International 
Trade, and the Minister for International Cooperation may recommend 
additional eligible importing countries.152 Furthermore, a non-WTO 
member state may be added if it is on the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development’s (“OECD”) 153 list of countries that are eli-
gible for official development assistance, the country faces “a national 
emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency,” and has “insuffi-
cient[] pharmaceutical capacity to manufacture that product.”154 
Like the Life-Saving Medicines Export Act, the generic company must 
submit an application specifying the name and quantity of the drug it 
seeks to produce and export and its patented brand-name equivalent.155 In 
addition, the generic company must have made a written request to the 
patent holder for a voluntary license, and must wait at least thirty days 
after such unsuccessful negotiation before filing an application for the 
compulsory license.156 
The Pledge to Africa Act also requires that the generic company pay 
remuneration to the patent holder.157 The Governor in Council deter-
mines an appropriate royalty amount in light of the humanitarian and 
non-commercial reasons behind the compulsory license.158 However, the 
patent owner may seek a Federal Court order that requires a royalty 
payment greater than the amount that the Governor in Council has de-
termined.159 The Federal Court may only order a higher royalty payment 
if the Court finds that the Governor in Council’s remuneration determi-
nation is inadequate, when considering the humanitarian and non-
commercial reasons behind the compulsory license and the medicine’s 
economic value to the importing country.160 
When a compulsory license is granted in Canada, it is valid for two 
years, with the opportunity to renew the license for an additional two 
                                                                                                             
especially those resulting from HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics.” 
See 2004 S.C., ch. 23 § 21.03(1)(a)(i). 
 152. See id. §§ 21.03(1)(b)–(d). 
 153. The thirty member states of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development are “committed to democracy and the market economy.” OECD, About 
OECD, http://www.oecd.org/pages/0,3417,en_36734052_36734103_1_1_1_1_1,00.html 
(last visited Oct. 9, 2007). 
 154. 2004 S.C., ch. 23 § 21.03(1)(d)(ii). 
 155. See id. § 21.04(2). Compare id. with S. 3175 § 3(a) (discussing the Life-Saving 
Medicines Export Act compulsory license application). 
 156. See 2004 S.C., ch. 23 § 21.04(3)(c). 
 157. See id. § 21.08. 
 158. See id. §§ 21.08(1)–(2). 
 159. See id. §§ 21.08(4)–(6). 
 160. See id. § 21.08(7). 
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years.161 The generic company must produce medicine that is physically 
distinguishable from the patented equivalent through distinct “marking, 
embossing, labelling, and packaging.”162 In addition, the Minister of 
Health must approve the generic drug as meeting the requirements of 
Canada’s Food and Drugs Act.163 
The patent owner may apply to the Federal Court for an order terminat-
ing the compulsory license.164 The patent holder must show that either 
the application for the compulsory license contained inaccurate informa-
tion, or that the generic company did not follow provisions of the license, 
such as paying the specified remuneration to the patent holder or export-
ing only to the authorized importing country.165 The patent owner may 
assert that: (1) the compulsory license application contained inaccurate 
information; (2) the generic company failed to set up a Web site required 
to disclose information about the generic medicines;166 (3) the generic 
company failed to notify the patentee, importing country, or the medicine 
purchaser within fifteen days of exporting the medicines;167 (4) the ge-
neric company has failed to pay the required royalty within the pre-
scribed time; (5) the generic company failed to provide the Commis-
sioner or the patent holder with a copy of the agreement underlying the 
compulsory license application;168 (6) the medicines were re-exported 
with the generic company’s knowledge; (7) the medicines were exported 
to somewhere other than the authorized importing country; (7) the quan-
tity of exported medicines exceeded the authorized amount; or (8) the 
medicines exported to a non-WTO member state have been used for 
commercial purposes.169 
                                                                                                             
 161. See 2004 S.C., ch. 23 §§ 21.09, 21.12(1)–(4). 
 162. Id. § 21.04(3)(b). See generally Anthony P. Valach, Jr., TRIPS: Protecting the 
Rights of Patent Holders and Addressing Public Health Issues in Developing Countries, 
4 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 156, 168–70 (2005) (explaining that the generic company 
must consider that changes to pill size, shape and color may incidentally affect the ge-
neric medicine’s bio-equivalence to the patented medicine). 
 163. See 2004 S.C., ch. 23 § 21.04(3)(b). 
 164. See id. § 21.14. 
 165. See id.  
 166. See id. § 21.06 (requiring the generic company to establish a Web site to disclose 
information on the product, the importing country, and the distinguishing features of the 
generic medicine, as well as the date when the medicine is exported).  
 167. See id. § 21.07 (requiring the generic company to notify the parties involved that 
the generic medicines will be exported within fifteen days).  
 168. See id. § 21.16 (requiring the generic company to provide a copy of the underly-
ing agreement and a statement defining both the monetary value of the agreement and the 
number of units to be sold pursuant to the agreement).  
 169. See 2004 S.C., ch. 23 § 21.14. 
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The Federal Court may also terminate the license if it finds that the un-
derlying agreement to sell the generic medicines is “commercial in na-
ture.”170 If the Court terminates the license because of a commercial 
agreement, the Federal Court may order the generic company to turn 
over any remaining medicines to the patent holder, as though the generic 
company had infringed on the patent.171 
The Pledge to Africa Act provides for an advisory committee to facili-
tate the administration of Canada’s compulsory licensing system.172 
However, unlike the advisory board created pursuant to the Life-Saving 
Medicines Export Act,173 the Canadian advisory committee’s duties are 
extremely limited. The advisory committee only advises the Minister and 
the Minster of Health in the recommendations that the Minister and the 
Minister of Health make to the Governor in Council regarding additions 
and deletions to the list of approved patented products.174 
IV. A MORE EFFICIENT COMPULSORY LICENSING INFRASTRUCTURE IN 
LIGHT OF THE CRITICISMS OF THE PLEDGE TO AFRICA ACT 
When the Life-Saving Medicines Export Act was introduced, U.S. 
lawmakers were confident that it addressed the flaws found in other 
countries’ similar legislation.175 Specifically, lawmakers identified key 
provisions of Canada’s compulsory licensing legislation that made ge-
neric companies reluctant to participate.176 The most striking criticism, 
however, is that more than three years after the legislation was passed, a 
                                                                                                             
 170. 2004 S.C., ch. 23 § 21.17. The agreement may be deemed “commercial in nature” 
if the generic medicine is sold for more than twenty-five percent of the price of either the 
patented medicine or any equivalent medicine that has been produced with the patent 
holder’s consent. However, this determination also takes into account the generic com-
pany’s need to make a reasonable return on the medicines, the normal profitability of 
commercial pharmaceutical agreements, and international pricing trends for products 
supplied for humanitarian purposes. See id. § 21.17(1)–(2). In finding a commercial 
agreement, the Federal Court may fashion a remedy on “any terms that it considers ap-
propriate.” Id. § 21.17(3). Rather than terminating the license, the Court may instead 
require the generic company to pay the patent owner a royalty amount that adequately 
compensates for the commercial use of the medicine. See id. § 21.17(3)(b). 
 171. See id. § 21.17(4)(a). In the alternative, the patent holder may nevertheless permit 
the generic company to release the remaining medicines to the importing country. See id. 
§ 21.17(4)(b). 
 172. See id. § 21.18. 
 173. See S. 3175 § 5. See also supra notes 133–34 and accompanying text. 
 174. See 2004 S.C., ch. 23 § 21.18. 
 175. See 152 CONG. REC. S233-01, S5246–47 (daily ed. May 25, 2006) (statement of 
Sen. Leahy). 
 176. See id. 
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single pill has not left Canada.177 The Life-Saving Medicines Export Act 
was touted as addressing the concerns over a Canadian law that “permits 
dilatory and needless litigation, omits important medicines from a com-
plex list of covered drugs, and creates unnecessary bureaucratic 
hoops.”178 Nevertheless, even if the United States does succeed in ad-
dressing these so-called flaws, lawmakers must look at whether this is 
enough to allow the U.S. law to succeed. Unfortunately, no country has 
established a benchmark TRIPS-compliant compulsory licensing system 
that has effectively increased access to essential life-saving medicines.179 
However, by addressing the concerns raised over the Pledge to Africa 
                                                                                                             
 177. See Lisa Priest, Canadian Companies Agree to Share Generic AIDS drugs with 
Rwanda, GLOBE AND MAIL (Toronto), Aug. 9, 2007, at A3. However, the first pills may 
leave Canada in the near future. On July 19, 2007, Rwanda became the first country to 
inform the WTO of its intent to use the 2003 Decision to access life-saving medicines. 
See WTO: 2007 News Items, http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news07_e/public_ 
health_july07_e.htm (last visited Sept. 29, 2007). Rwanda, a country with 250,000 people 
infected with HIV, seeks to import antiretrovirals under Canada’s compulsory licensing 
system. See Lisa Priest, supra, at A3. Multinational pharmaceutical company Glaxo-
SmithKline (“GSK”) subsequently gave its consent under the Canadian compulsory li-
censing system to permit the Canadian company Apotex to produce an antiretroviral that 
contains two molecules that have been patented by GSK. See Press Release, Glaxo-
SmithKline, GSK Gives Consent Under Canada’s Access to Medicines Regime for Ge-
neric Version of HIV/AIDS Medicine for Use in Rwanda (Aug. 8, 2007). Moreover, 
GSK has agreed to waive royalties provided that Apotex supplies the drugs to Rwanda on 
a no-profit basis. See id. On September 25, 2007, a compulsory license was granted to 
Apotex, permitting it to proceed with manufacturing the antiretroviral. See ApoTriavir 
Approved by Health Canada Under CAMR Provisions, ANTI-INFECTIVE DRUG NEWS, 
Sept. 25, 2007. If the agreement is completed, up to 16 million tablets of the antiretroviral 
will be sent to Rwanda, or enough to treat 21,000 Rwandans for one year or 200,000 
Rwandans for one month. See Lisa Priest, supra, at A3. Apotex, however, cautioned that 
not all barriers to access have been removed. See id. Apotex must still reach similar 
agreements regarding the other patented molecules contained in the antiretroviral that are 
not patented by GSK. See id. (quoting Apotex’s director of public and government af-
fairs: “The bottom line is that the patentees have not lifted all of the barriers to shipment. 
. . . Apotex cannot ship tomorrow.”). 
 178. See 152 CONG. REC. S233-01, S5247 (daily ed. May 25, 2006) (statement of Sen. 
Leahy). 
 179. It may be helpful to note Brazil’s Industrial Property Law permitting compulsory 
licensing. Although the law is not used to produce generic medicines, Brazil has success-
fully negotiated with multinational pharmaceutical companies by threatening to grant 
compulsory licensing to generic companies. As a result of these threats, patent holders 
have negotiated affordable antiretroviral drugs. Therefore, although Brazil did not issue a 
compulsory license, it attained a price reduction of essential medicines that may not have 
been possible without compulsory licensing legislation. See Rahul Rajkumar, The Central 
American Free Trade Agreement: An End Run Around the Doha Declaration on Trips 
and Public Health, 15 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 433, 443 (2005). 
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Act, the Life-Saving Medicines Export Act is off to a good start creating 
an effective compulsory licensing system. Most of the arguments over 
the Pledge to Africa Act point out that the Canadian compulsory licens-
ing system incorporates stringent regulations that are not necessarily re-
quired by the WTO’s 2003 Decision.180 Moreover, critics emphasize that 
the Pledge to Africa Act involves burdensome bureaucratic red tape and 
procedural barriers, which may prevent essential medicines from getting 
to people that need them in developing countries.181 More importantly, 
however, a compulsory licensing system will only succeed if it gives ge-
neric companies the economic incentive to participate. If the Life-Saving 
Medicines Export Act does not provide sufficient financial motivation, 
generic companies will not produce affordable essential medicines, re-
gardless of how many people might die as a result.182 Unfortunately, de-
spite a praiseworthy attempt, the incentives provided by the Life-Saving 
Medicines Export Act will not be enough to succeed. If the U.S. gov-
ernment passes the legislation as it currently stands, it will follow in the 
footsteps of the Pledge to Africa Act; not a single pill will leave the 
United States. 
A. Provisions Unnecessary to Comply with the WTO Agreements 
One focus of strong criticism of the Pledge to Africa Act is its limita-
tion on medicines that can be produced under compulsory license.183 The 
Canadian government only permits compulsory licenses for pharmaceu-
tical products that were on the WHO list of essential medicines and were 
protected by Canadian patent when the Pledge to Africa Act was en-
                                                                                                             
 180. See Canadian HIV/AIDS Legal Network, Canada Proceeds with Bill C-9 on 
Cheaper Medicine Exports: NGOs Say Initiative is Important, and Urge Other Countries 
to Avoid the Flaws in the Canadian Model, supra note 143. 
 181. See supra notes 141–42 and accompanying text (discussing criticism by NGOs, 
civil society groups, and the pharmaceutical industry). 
 182. See RICHARDS, supra note 15, at 163. 
 183. The argument that the Pledge to Africa Act, as well as any other legislation of its 
kind, should not be limited to a specific list of medicines is grounded in a broad interpre-
tation of the Doha Declaration. Paragraph 1 “recognize[s] the gravity of the public health 
problems afflicting many developing and least-developed countries, especially those 
resulting from HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics.” Doha Declaration, 
supra note 51. As such, the Doha Declaration should extend to all public health needs. 
Furthermore, the Doha Declaration affirms “that the TRIPS Agreement does not and 
should not prevent Members from taking measures to protect public health.” Id. By mak-
ing such a general statement, the WTO can be seen as addressing all health issues, and 
not just a set of specific diseases. See Frederick M. Abbott, The WTO Medicines Deci-
sion: World Pharmaceutical Trade and Protection of Public Health, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 
317, 328 (2005). 
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acted.184 However, this original list omits “even the most widely sought 
fixed-dose combination of anti-retrovirals.”185 Although the Minister and 
the Minister of Health may review and approve new medicines,186 this 
process may find itself stuck in bureaucratic red tape for months. The 
Life-Saving Medicines Export Act addresses this issue by permitting the 
production of any pharmaceutical product used to combat life-
threatening public health problems.187 Because it does not limit the list of 
approved medicines, the Life-Saving Medicines Act addresses current 
public health issues, as well as unforeseeable future issues. In addition, 
the proposed U.S. system eliminates the procedural barriers involved in 
maintaining and updating a list of approved medicines. 
Critics of the Pledge to Africa Act also object strongly to the limita-
tions on eligible importing countries. The original list includes UN-
determined LDCs and WTO member states that have either: (1) not de-
clined to import under the compulsory licensing system, or (2) stated an 
intention to use the system for national emergency or insufficient manu-
                                                                                                             
 184. See 2004 S.C., ch. 23 Schedule 1. See also supra notes 146–47 and accompanying 
text. The Canadian government has amended the original list of permissible pharmaceuti-
cal products since the Pledge to Africa Act was passed. See Order Amending Schedule 1 
to the Patent Act (Oseltamivir Phosphate) SOR/2006-204 (Can); Order Amending 
Schedule 1 to the Patent Act (Lamivudine + Nevirapine + Zidovudine) SOR/2005-276 
(Can).  
 185. See Kiddell-Monroe, supra note 138. 
 186. See 2004 S.C., ch. 23 § 21.03(1)(a). See also supra note 151 and accompanying 
text. The medicine approval process was put to the test when a generic pharmaceutical 
company sought to add oseltamivir phosphate to Canada’s list of approved medicines. 
Oseltamivir, better known as the patented drug Tamiflu, is effective against various 
strains of influenza, such as the fatal H5N1 strain of avian flu. See Legal Network Calls 
for Compulsory Licensing of Tamiflu, NETWORK NEWS, Mar. 2006, at 6. On February 13, 
2006, generic pharmaceutical company Biolyse formally requested that oseltamivir phos-
phate be added to the Patent Act’s Schedule 1 drugs that are eligible for export. See Let-
ter from Joanne Csete, Executive Director, Canadian HIV/AIDS Legal Network, to Susan 
Bincoletto, Director General, Marketplace Framework Policy Branch, Industry Canada 
(July 26, 2006), available at www.aidslaw.ca/publications/interfaces/downloadFile.php? 
ref=706. On July 1, 2006, the Departments of Industry and Health published a proposed 
order that would amend Schedule 1 of Canada’s Patent Act, which lists the approved 
medicines. See id. However, the Canadian federal government did not add oseltamivir to 
Schedule 1 until over seven months later. See Helen Branswell, Canada Agrees to Add 
Tamiflu to List of Drugs That Can Be Made Off Patent, CANADIAN PRESS, Sep 27, 2006. 
 187. See S. 3175 § 3(a). See also supra notes 110–12 and accompanying text. It is 
interesting to note that the United States called for a “limited approach” during WTO 
negotiation talks concerning the TRIPS Agreement, and wanted to limit the diseases that 
the Doha Declaration covered. By doing so, the United States sought to limit the number 
of patents that would be overridden by compulsory licenses and to diminish the risk that 
pharmaceutical revenues would be jeopardized. See Abbott, supra note 183, at 327–29. 
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facturing capacity.188 Additionally, a non-WTO member state may be 
added to the list of approved countries if it is on the OECD’s list of coun-
tries eligible for official development assistance.189 Nevertheless, be-
cause Canada’s original list includes only WTO members states, it fails 
to recognize that many developing countries’ citizens have no access to 
essential medicines, regardless of whether the country is a WTO member 
state or not.190 Although the Pledge to Africa Act includes procedures for 
adding eligible importing countries, such procedures cannot happen im-
mediately, and a country may have to wait months to be reviewed and 
approved. In addition, as countries are added or removed from the UN 
list of LDCs or acquire WTO membership, Canada’s list of eligible 
countries must be updated, resulting in an additional administrative bur-
den. The Life-Saving Medicines Export Act, on the other hand, avoids 
this unnecessary red tape; there is no specific list of eligible importing 
countries.191 Instead, the U.S. compulsory licensing system may export 
to: UN-determined LDCs, WTO members that have stated their intention 
to use the system, and non-WTO member states that lack adequate manu-
facturing capabilities to produce the requested drug.192 Therefore, the 
United States reduces the administrative costs of maintaining a list, and 
more importantly, does not exclude any countries that are in need of life-
saving medicines. 
                                                                                                             
 188. See 2004 S.C., ch. 23 Schedules 2–4. See also supra notes 148–49 and accompa-
nying text. Countries such as East Timor and Lebanon are excluded from the list of eligi-
ble importing companies because they are neither LDCs nor WTO members. See Policy 
Statement, Development & Peace, Urgent Appeal to Amend Bill for Cheap Medicines to 
HIV/AIDS Patients (Mar. 1, 2004), available at http://www.devp.org/testA/policy/ 
declarations04_2-e.htm. 
 189. See 2004 S.C., ch. 23 §21.03(d)(ii). See also supra notes 153–54 and accompany-
ing text. 
 190. MSF, Amending Canada’s Drug Patent Law: A Betrayal of Patients in Develop-
ing Countries, supra note 142, quoting Richard Elliott, Director of Legal Research and 
Policy at the Canadian HIV/AIDS Legal Network (“People in all developing countries 
struggle with poverty and public health needs, and should benefit from this important 
legislation regardless of whether their country belongs to the WTO.”). 
 191. See S. 3175 § 3(a). See also supra notes 106–07 and accompanying text. Again, 
as with the “limited approach” to medicines eligible for generic production under com-
pulsory license, the United States ironically sought to limit the countries “with insuffi-
cient or no manufacturing capacities in the pharmaceutical sector” that were provided for 
in the Doha Declaration. Abbott, supra note 183, at 334–35. In doing so, the United 
States and other developing countries could limit the number of patents that would be 
overridden, as well as minimize the amount of revenues that would be lost by patent-
owning pharmaceutical companies. See id. 
 192. See S. 3175 § 3(a). See also supra notes 106–07 and accompanying text. 
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The Pledge to Africa Act is also widely criticized for requiring generic 
companies to enter into export agreements only with state govern-
ments.193 Therefore, NGOs, such as Médecins Sans Frontières/Doctors 
without Borders, are not granted access to life-saving medicines under 
the Canadian system.194 International agencies and NGOs play a critical 
role in treating public health needs in developing countries and often 
have more knowledge about a country’s large-scale health epidemic than 
government officials.195 Moreover, NGOs may also know the best way to 
administer the life-saving medicines to improve public health.196 The 
Life-Saving Medicines Export Act acknowledges this problem and per-
mits licensees to include the names of NGOs that will assist the import-
ing country with the medicines.197 However, this provision does not per-
mit export agreements between a generic company and an NGO. If an 
NGO seeks essential medicines, it must work with a country’s govern-
ment to obtain these medicines. Moreover, if an NGO wants to supply 
essential medicines for a given disease in multiple countries, it must co-
ordinate with each country’s government. NGOs may face roadblocks if 
a government lacks resources, or is simply reluctant, to collaborate in 
this effort. Unnecessary procedures such as these decrease the chances 
that essential medicines will reach people in need. Although the drafters 
of the Life-Saving Medicines Export Act specifically wanted to include 
NGOs in the U.S. compulsory licensing system, the existing provision is 
not optimal. Instead, generic companies should be permitted to enter into 
export agreements directly with NGOs, provided that the NGOs supply 
the generic medicines to eligible importing countries. 
B. Procedural Barriers 
The Pledge to Africa Act also creates “unnecessary bureaucratic 
hoops” by potentially requiring generic companies to unnecessarily file 
                                                                                                             
 193. See 2004 S.C., ch. 23 Schedules 2–4. See also supra notes 148–49 and accompa-
nying text. In making amendments to the proposed Pledge to Africa Act, the Canadian 
government recognized the need for generic companies to contract directly with NGOs, 
and consequently proposed an amendment to address the issue. However, this amend-
ment was removed in the process of last-minute changes. See Canadian HIV/AIDS Legal 
Network, Canada Proceeds with Bill C-9 on Cheaper Medicine Exports: NGOs Say Ini-
tiative is Important, and Urge Other Countries to Avoid the Flaws in the Canadian Model, 
supra note 143. 
 194. See Acharya & Douglas, supra note 147, at 2; Penner & Narayanan, supra note 
138, at 467. 
 195. See Valach, supra note 162, at 172. 
 196. See id. 
 197. See S. 3175 § 3(a). See also supra note 109 and accompanying text. 
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many compulsory license applications.198 First, a Canadian compulsory 
license permits a generic company to produce a specific quantity of 
medicine for only one country. Therefore, if the importing country needs 
an increased quantity of the same medicine, the generic company must 
submit an application for a new license, which authorizes the additional 
drug quantity.199 A new application for an increased drug quantity, which 
could feasibly occur on a regular basis, is an unnecessary waste of time 
and resources. Moreover, if multiple countries need the medicine, the 
generic company must submit a compulsory license application for each 
country. Again, this requirement creates needless paperwork for both the 
generic company and the Canadian government.200 Second, the Governor 
in Council has only two options in deciding an application—either grant 
the application or deny it. Therefore, if the generic company fails to in-
clude one piece of necessary information, the application is denied and 
the generic company must start the application process from the begin-
ning. 
The Life-Saving Medicines Export Act addresses each of these defi-
ciencies. First, a generic company need not submit separate applications 
if the quantity of medicine they seek to produce changes or multiple 
countries need the medicine. If the generic company discovers that the 
importing country needs additional medicines, the generic company noti-
fies the PTO, and the PTO may increase the authorized amount of medi-
cines if it is appropriate.201 Second, the Life-Saving Medicines Export 
Act provides for multi-country licenses, in which the generic company 
submits one application for authorization to export medicines to multiple 
specified countries.202 In addition, when the PTO considers a compulsory 
license application, it has three options for its decision. In addition to 
granting or denying the application, it may also deny the application with 
a request for more information, giving the generic company thirty days to 
respond without having to start a new application. A new application 
would not only require the burden of redundant paperwork, but would 
also require the generic company to request a voluntary license from the 
patent holder, and then wait an additional sixty days after submitting that 
request to submit a compulsory license application to the PTO. 
                                                                                                             
 198. 152 CONG. REC. S233-01, S5247 (daily ed. May 25, 2006) (statement of Sen. 
Leahy). 
 199. See Valach, supra note 162, at 168. 
 200. See id. at 169. 
 201. See S. 3175 § 3(a). See also supra note 121 and accompanying text. 
 202. See S. 3175 § 3(a). See also supra note 108 and accompanying text. 
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The Pledge to Africa Act has also been criticized as “permitting dila-
tory and needless litigation.”203 The Pledge to Africa Act grants the pat-
ent holder the right to petition the Federal Court to review the authorized 
license for numerous reasons.204 Although many of the grounds for ter-
mination ensure that the compulsory licensing system is not abused, 
other grounds for termination penalize the generic company for technical 
administrative violations. For example, a license may be terminated if the 
generic company fails to maintain or update a Web site that is required 
by the Act, or fails to notify the proper parties during the exporting proc-
ess.205 The patent holder may use these administrative grounds to frus-
trate the generic company or to delay the production of the essential 
medicines. Consequently, a generic company may be deterred from par-
ticipating in the compulsory licensing system because of the threat of 
litigation. 
In addition, the patent holder has the right to litigate in Federal Court 
over whether the export agreement is “commercial in nature.”206 Unlike 
the above-mentioned grounds for Federal Court, the Court applies a bal-
ancing test to determine whether an export agreement is commercial in 
nature.207 Because the result of a balancing test is always uncertain, and 
there is no case law that predicts the outcome, generic companies may be 
reluctant to take this risk, especially if they are not expecting high 
enough levels of profit from the license agreements to cover the cost of 
drawn-out litigation. 
The Life-Saving Medicines Export Act reduces the grounds upon 
which the patent holder may challenge a compulsory license. A patent 
holder may petition the PTO for review of a compulsory license only if 
                                                                                                             
 203. 152 CONG. REC. S233-01, S5247 (daily ed. May 25, 2006) (statement of Sen. 
Leahy). 
 204. See 2004 S.C., ch. 23 §21.14; Penner & Narayanan, supra note 140, at 467–69 
(“[A] more significant roadblock for the use of the authorization under the Pledge to Af-
rica Act may be the potential uncertainty associated with any such authorization. This 
uncertainty arises from the ability of the Federal Court, at the request of the patentee, to 
review and possibly amend the terms of the authorization.”). See also supra notes 164–69 
and accompanying text. 
 205. See 2004 S.C., ch. 23 §21.14. Jim Keon, President of CGPA, explained that “‘[i]t 
is unlikely that a generic company would spend the time and money fighting the brands 
in court over these contracts . . . . Once the brand company initiated litigation, the generic 
firm would probably withdraw its request for a license.’” CGPA, Government Amend-
ments to Bill C-9 Fall Short, supra note 143. See also supra notes 164–69 and accompa-
nying text. 
 206. See 2004 S.C., ch. 23 §21.17. See also supra notes 170–71 and accompanying 
text.  
 207. See 2004 S.C., ch. 23 §21.17(2). See also supra note 170 and accompanying text. 
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the patent owner believes that “the circumstances that have led to the 
granting of the license cease to exist and it appears probable that such 
circumstances will not reoccur.”208 Although it seems like this single 
provision encompasses all of the enumerated administrative provisions of 
the Pledge to Africa Act, the Life-Saving Medicines Export Act never-
theless does away with the provision permitting the patent holder to chal-
lenge a compulsory license because it is “commercial in nature.” As 
such, this omission decreases the risk that a compulsory license will be 
revoked after the generic company has spent multiple years and millions 
of dollars developing the medicines.209 
One must further analyze the Life-Saving Medicines Export Act to de-
termine whether it streamlines compulsory licensing while sustaining 
compliance with the TRIPS agreement. One of the most important issues 
a country must address is whether the law eliminates injunctive relief to 
the patent holder.210 The Life-Saving Medicines Export Act avoids this 
potential obstacle by amending the patent laws to expressly state that 
production of medicines pursuant to the Life-Saving Medicines Export 
Act does not constitute patent infringement.211 Therefore, patent holders 
are not entitled to injunctive relief against the generic company.212 
In addition, an optimal compulsory licensing system must eliminate 
procedural barriers in times of exigency.213 The Life-Saving Medicines 
Export Act provides for such expedited approval for “emergencies and 
circumstances of extreme urgency,” including waiving the required prior 
negotiation with the patent holder, as well as postponing the royalty de-
termination until after the compulsory license has been granted.214 
Moreover, a compulsory licensing system is more efficient if it utilizes 
administrative review procedures instead of judicial review.215 The Life-
                                                                                                             
 208. S. 3175 § 3(a). See also supra note 122 and accompanying text. 
 209. See CGPA, Government Amendments to Bill C-9 Fall Short, supra note 143. 
 210. See JAMES LOVE, Four Practical Measures to Enhance Access to Medical Tech-
nologies, in NEGOTIATING HEALTH 241, 245 (Pedro Roffe et al. eds., 2006). 
 211. See S. 3175 § 4. See also supra note 104 and accompanying text. 
 212. Current patent laws provide the patent holder with injunctive relief. See 35 U.S.C. 
§ 281 (“A patentee shall have remedy by civil action for infringement of his patent.”); 35 
U.S.C. § 283 (“The several courts having jurisdiction of cases under this title may grant 
injunctions in accordance with the principles of equity to prevent the violation of any 
right secured by patent, on such terms as the court deems reasonable.”). 
 213. See LOVE, supra note 210, at 245. 
 214. S. 3175 § 3(a). See also supra notes 130–32 and accompanying text. 
 215. See LOVE, supra note 210, at 245 (identifying the need that “a remedy to an anti-
competitive practice be . . . administrative rather than a judicial procedure”). The Life-
Saving Medicines Export Act grants compulsory licenses to improve access to medicines, 
and not to remedy anti-competitive pricing or practices. Nevertheless, the same analysis 
268 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 33:1 
Saving Medicines Export Act provides that a generic company may ap-
peal the denial of its application for a compulsory license in the U.S. 
Federal Circuit Court of Appeals.216 Judicial review in the federal courts 
can be more time-consuming and the status of a compulsory licensing 
application may not be resolved for years. Therefore, initial review by an 
administrative body may be more desirable in the interest of expediency. 
An example of such an administrative body would be the PTO Board of 
Patent Appeals and Interferences, where a patent applicant may first ap-
peal a final patent rejection before appealing to the U.S. Federal Circuit 
Court of Appeals.217 
Furthermore, a provision requiring compulsory licenses in certain cases 
should be considered. Such mandatory licensing is advantageous because 
it: reduces transaction costs and uncertainty about whether a compulsory 
license will be available, ensures that policy goals are served; prevents 
patent holders from coercing government officials into blocking a com-
pulsory license; and stops opportunities for corruption by generic com-
panies or patent holders.218 Nevertheless, it is difficult to think of a 
minimum basis for a mandatory compulsory license that would not face 
extreme resistance by both the pharmaceutical sector and IPR propo-
nents. Consequently, the United States should omit any such mandatory 
provision from the Life-Saving Medicines Export Act and seek to estab-
lish a fundamental system, rather than risking the entire compulsory li-
censing system. Once a basic system is implemented pursuant to the 
2003 Decision219 and successfully increases access to essential medi-
cines, then legislators can consider additional provisions such as one 
granting mandatory authorization in limited circumstances. 
The Life-Saving Medicines Export Act also attempts to create a com-
pulsory licensing system that is smarter than its Canadian equivalent by 
creating an advisory board to consider the conflicting interests that a 
compulsory license would affect—the rights of both patent-owning and 
generic pharmaceutical companies, the severity of health pandemics, and 
the needs of impoverished countries.220 However, the advisory board’s 
                                                                                                             
would apply to review of compulsory licenses granted pursuant to the Life-Saving Medi-
cines Export Act. The basic argument is simply that administrative procedures are more 
expeditious than the judicial process. 
 216. See S. 3175 § 3(a). See also supra note 118 and accompanying text. 
 217. See U.S. PTO, Appeal to the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences and to the 
Courts, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/doc/general/index.html#appeal (last vis-
ited Oct. 9, 2007). 
 218. See LOVE, supra note 210, at 245. 
 219. See supra Part I.C. 
 220. See S. 3175 § 5. See also supra notes 133–34 and accompanying text.  
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role is more significant under the Life-Savings Medicines Export Act 
than its Canadian counterpart, whose role is limited to only assisting in 
recommendations for approved medicines.221 Because a compulsory li-
censing system involves many conflicting interests, the National Advi-
sory Board on Implementation of the General Council Decision was de-
signed so that no interest is completely disregarded. Such an advisory 
board is critical in guiding the U.S. compulsory licensing system to suc-
cess. 
C. Economic Incentives 
More important than procedural efficiencies is the need to provide ge-
neric companies with financial incentives. The CIPIH summarized this 
point best when it said: “Although their business models are different, 
generic companies share with the research-based industry the common 
motivation of serving the interests of their shareholders. The mechanism 
will not be used if the financial incentives for participation, taking ac-
count of the risks involved, are deemed inadequate.”222 The problem here 
is twofold. First, as a private, profit-seeking firm, a generic company will 
not produce essential medicines—even if they do save lives—if the mar-
ket does not allow the generic company to meet its minimum rate of re-
turn on development of the medicines.223 Second, developing countries 
need these life-saving medicines the most, but lack the funding required 
to allow generic companies to meet their minimum rates of return.224 Be-
cause it is outside of the scope of this Note to address the problem of 
poverty in developing countries, this Part focuses on whether the Life-
Saving Medicines Export Act allows generic companies to exceed their 
minimum rates of return, thus motivating them to participate in the com-
pulsory licensing system. 
The Pledge to Africa Act, the model or template for the Life-Saving 
Medicines Export Act, also fails to provide adequate economic incen-
tives.225 For instance, the two-year lifespan of a Canadian compulsory 
license lifespan is too short.226 Even though the license may be extended 
                                                                                                             
 221. See 2004 S.C., ch. 23 § 21.18. See also supra notes 172–74 and accompanying 
text.  
 222. WHO CIPIH, Public Health: Innovation and Intellectual Property Rights, supra 
note 17, at 136. 
 223. See RICHARDS, supra note 15, at 163. 
 224. See id. 
 225. See CGPA, Government Amendments to Bill C-9 Fall Short, supra note 143. 
 226. See 2004 S.C., ch. 23 § 21.09; CANADIAN HIV/AIDS LEGAL NETWORK, THE JEAN 
CHRÉTIEN PLEDGE TO AFRICA ACT AND ITS IMPACT ON IMPROVING ACCESS TO HIV/AIDS 
TREATMENT IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 5, supra note 141. 
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for an additional two years227 and the generic company may apply for 
another license after expiration of the first license, the short compulsory 
license term does not provide adequate economic incentives to produce 
drugs under the new system.228 The financial costs and associated risks of 
applying for a compulsory license may exceed the revenue generated 
during the short license term.229 Because a generic company must still 
incur R&D costs—albeit not as high as new drug R&D—the generic 
company must also be permitted to recover these costs during the life-
span of the compulsory license. The Life-Saving Medicines Export Act 
improves this situation by setting the lifespan of a U.S. compulsory li-
cense at seven years, with a potential extension for another seven 
years.230 Although the lifespan of a U.S. compulsory license is over three 
times as long as its Canadian equivalent, it is nevertheless still insuffi-
cient to allow a generic company to recoup its production costs. If a pat-
ent is set to expire in fewer than seven years, a generic company will not 
apply for a compulsory license to produce the medicine because it will 
fear that other companies will produce generic equivalents once the pat-
ent expires,231 which may undercut the generic company’s profits. More-
over, most of the generic company’s seven-year window will be devoted 
to the task of having to reverse-engineer the medicine without the patent 
holder’s assistance.232 Therefore, a generic company will refuse to par-
ticipate when a short compulsory lifespan creates such a great risk of 
economic loss. 
Moreover, a longer lifespan will not significantly increase the profits of 
a generic company when the compulsory license limits the quantity of 
medicines that can be produced, and consequently limits the profits that 
may be earned. Therefore, the United States must do more to ensure that 
the Life-Saving Medicines Export Act reduces the economic burdens that 
may deter generic companies from producing essential medicines for 
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developing countries.233 Specifically, the United States must assess the 
costs and risks involved in producing medicines under the Life-Saving 
Medicines Export Act, and attempt to minimize both. 
1. The Cost and Risk to the Generic Company 
Even though a generic company does not incur the high costs of new 
drug R&D, it must bear the significant burden of front-end investment.234 
The pharmaceutical industry is knowledge intensive, and most of the cost 
lies in R&D of new drugs.235 However, a generic company must still in-
cur the costs of producing the medicine, which involves reverse-
engineering the drugs without assistance from the patent holder.236 The 
patent specifications may not provide the generic company with enough 
information to facilitate quick and easy reproduction of the medicine.237 
Moreover, the most efficient process for manufacturing the medicine 
may be protected by a different patent, which may be owned by yet an-
other pharmaceutical company.238 
A generic company also incurs the cost of royalty payments to the pat-
ent holder, which must be paid within forty-five days of exporting the 
medicine,239 regardless of whether the generic company has seen any 
sales profit from the medicines. Although the Life-Saving Medicines 
Export Act caps the maximum royalty payment at four percent of the 
patented medicine’s commercial value,240 this payment may still be rela-
tively costly. Because patented medicines enjoy market exclusivity, and 
are therefore priced high to recoup hefty R&D expenses,241 a seemingly 
low maximum royalty of four percent may nevertheless burden the ge-
neric company if the medicine has high commercial value.  
Moreover, a generic company faces the risk that the market demand for 
the medicines will not be great enough within the importing country, de-
spite the discounted prices, to meet supply. Because the generic company 
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may only export the medicines to the specified importing country, the 
generic company must bear the loss if it is unable to sell enough medi-
cine to that country. 
2. Reducing the Cost and Risk to the Generic Company 
First, turning to the generic drug production cost specifically addressed 
in the Life-Saving Medicines Export Act, a generic company licensee 
must pay remuneration to the patent holder.242 The determination of the 
amount of royalty payment is important because it must compensate the 
patent holder while also permitting the generic company to sell the medi-
cine at a low price to the impoverished individuals who need access to 
these life-saving essential medicines.243 
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  While there are countless ways to calculate remuneration, James Love looks at 
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the 2001 UN Development Programme Human Development Report, which recommends 
a royalty set at four percent of the selling price of the generic medicine. In addition, ge-
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ented products or processes covering one medicine, such as with HIV/AIDS combination 
drugs. Third, the Canadian royalty determination under the Pledge to Africa Act utilizes a 
sliding scale from 0.02 to 4 percent, with the highest royalty paid when medicines are 
imported by the most highly developed countries as determined by the Human Develop-
ment Report: 
 
178 – (importing country’s HDI rank)
177  X  0.04 
 
While this royalty determination is only slightly connected to the affordability of medi-
cines in the importing country, it also takes into account the generic manufacturing cost. 
Lastly, the more complex 2005 Tiered Royalty Method starts with a four percent royalty 
for high-income markets, which is decreased based on capacity to pay (as measured by 
per capita income or relative gross domestic product). Under this last method, royalties 
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The Life-Saving Medicines Export Act uses a case-by-case royalty de-
termination considering several factors, yet also provides that an alter-
nate royalty rate formula may be used, which closely resembles that of 
the Pledge to Africa Act.244 By using such a formula, a patent holder re-
ceives a lower royalty payment when the importing country is a less de-
veloped country. While the Life-Saving Medicines Export Act does fac-
tor in the humanitarian reasons for issuing the compulsory license, as 
well as the need for low-cost medicines, this royalty formula, as well as 
the discretion given in determining the royalty, fails to factor in the 
medicine’s therapeutic value or the ability of the generic company to pay 
the royalty amount.245 It is crucial that the PTO ensures that a royalty 
amount is low enough so that a generic company is not dissuaded from 
applying for a compulsory license. 
While it has been argued that insufficient royalty payments would dis-
courage R&D-based pharmaceutical companies from continuing their 
innovations, it is unlikely that these minimal royalty payments would 
have a significant impact on the patent holder. The pharmaceutical sector 
is the most lucrative industry in the United States and its profits more 
than make up for its R&D costs.246 In addition, the prices of generic 
medicines have arguably little correlation to the actual cost of producing 
the drugs, and therefore could be drastically reduced without undercut-
ting funds for R&D innovations.247 Furthermore, the estimate of R&D 
costs by pharmaceutical companies does not factor in the generous tax 
incentives they receive.248 Therefore, because there would be no over-
whelming burden placed on patent holders by reduced royalty payments 
for a relatively small market, there is no clear reason why the United 
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States should lower royalty payments to ease the burden on generic com-
panies. 
In addition to ensuring low royalty payments, the Life-Saving Medi-
cines Export Act must also reduce the front-end investment as much as 
possible for the generic company.249 The cost of manufacturing the ge-
neric medicines would be lower if the patent holder assisted the generic 
company in the re-engineering process. One possible way to motivate the 
patent holder to enter into such an agreement would be to set a higher 
royalty payment if the patent holder assists the generic company in de-
veloping the medicine. However, this alternative royalty calculation 
would need to take into account the cost to the patent holder in assisting 
the generic company, the cost savings to the generic company in receiv-
ing such assistance, and the need to keep the royalty payments as low as 
possible to permit the generic company to charge low drug prices to the 
importing country. In the alternative, public funding could offset the 
costs of the re-engineering effort. Options for public assistance include 
granting government subsidies to the generic company to be used solely 
to reverse-engineer the medicines, providing tax incentives to the generic 
company to help defray costs in general,250 or directly assisting with the 
development effort by directing government-run facilities to aid in the 
reverse-engineering effort. 
In addition to the motivation created by lower front-end investment, a 
generic company is also more likely to produce generic medicines for 
export when the prospective market is large, and therefore, the generic 
company anticipates that sales will compensate its investment costs.251 
While the Life-Saving Medicines Export Act does increase the potential 
market size by permitting multi-country applications,252 generic compa-
nies should be permitted to enter into export agreements directly with 
NGOs. The potential market size would be much greater, since NGOs 
could use the medicines to service multiple countries.253 However, de-
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spite such potentially large markets, there is still no guaranteed market 
for generic medicines. Just as patent protection ensures a patent holder 
that a sufficient market exists to allow the patent holder to meet its 
minimum rate of return, the Life-Saving Medicines Export Act also 
needs a mechanism to ensure a sufficient market. This may require the 
United States, or other financial donors, to enter into precommitments to 
purchase the generic medicines on behalf of the importing country if the 
importing country is unable to afford the medicines.254 
CONCLUSION 
Even though the TRIPS Agreement authorizes compulsory licensing255 
and the 2003 Decision permits export of medicines produced under com-
pulsory licenses,256 it is still unclear how a country can implement such a 
system effectively. While Canada’s Pledge to Africa Act was praised as 
the first legislation of its kind by a highly developed country, it has failed 
to increase access to essential life-saving medicines in the impoverished, 
underdeveloped world. Undoubtedly, the U.S. position on compulsory 
licenses for public health problems has made great progress since the 
days when the government staunchly opposed similar actions by South 
Africa in 1997.257 However, the United States still has a long way to go 
to do its part in improving access to medicines. In view of this goal, the 
United States hopes to follow in Canada’s footsteps with the Life-Saving 
Medicines Export Act. Unfortunately, as it stands, the Life-Saving Medi-
cines Export Act may also suffer the same fate as the Pledge to Africa 
Act; even if the bill survives and is passed into law, it is not likely that 
generic companies or importing countries will be eager to participate in 
the U.S. system. Because developing countries do not make the most 
attractive market for profit-seeking generic companies, the United States 
must greatly increase the economic incentives and reduce the procedural 
barriers of the Life-Saving Medicines Export Act. 
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Moreover, skeptics of compulsory licensing schema are reluctant to put 
great reliance on these licenses: 
[P]olicy-makers should view non-voluntary licensing of patented in-
ventions as but one item in an arsenal of tools that may be used to pro-
mote national systems of innovations . . . excessive reliance on compul-
sory licensing of patented inventions may simply mask deeper struc-
tural problems and make them harder to solve in the long run.258 
These critics argue that differential pricing of patented medicines and 
voluntary license agreements should be favored over government-
authorized compulsory licenses.259 However, given the substantial ur-
gency for essential life-saving medicines to treat diseases such as the 
HIV/AIDS pandemic,260 the Life-Saving Medicines Export Act may be a 
good start in developing a temporary solution to the problem. It is under-
standable that a pharmaceutical patent holder must be rewarded for its 
medical innovations, and must also be permitted market exclusivity to 
recoup the economic outlay for its extensive R&D. Nevertheless, the 
United States must step up and address the public health crises of devel-
oping countries that those countries cannot tackle themselves. At the 
very least, the United States can succeed as it did with Cipro,261 and use 
the threat of compulsory licensing under the Life-Saving Medicines Ex-
port Act to compel patent-holding pharmaceutical companies to reduce 
prices, thereby increasing access to the most essential life-saving medi-
cines for the world’s most destitute and powerless individuals. 
 
Jennifer A. Lazo* 
                                                                                                             
 258. See ROFFE, supra note 237, at 14 (citing Jerome H. Reichman with Catherine 
Hasenzahl, Non-Voluntary Licensing of Patented Inventions: Historical Perspective, 
Legal Framework under TRIPS, and an Overview of the Practice in Canada and the USA 
(UN Conference on Trade and Dev. & Int’l Ctr. for Trade and Sustainable Dev., Issue 
Paper No. 5, 2003)). 
 259. For a discussion on differential pricing and voluntary licensing agreements be-
tween patent holders and generic companies, see WHO CMH, supra note 11, at 87–91. 
 260. See supra notes 1–10 and accompanying text (discussing the status of the AIDS 
pandemic in 2006). 
 261. See supra notes 84–90 and accompanying text (explaining the anthrax scare in 
2001 and the U.S. government’s threat to override the Cipro patent). 
 *  B.A., Cornell University (2001); J.D., Brooklyn Law School (expected 2008). I 
would like to thank the Executive Board and the entire staff of the Brooklyn Journal of 
International Law for their assistance in editing this Note and preparing it for publication. 
I would also like to thank my family and friends for their love, support, and constant 
encouragement throughout law school. Any errors or omissions are my own. 
